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ARGUMENT 
THE APPELLANT DID MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
The State's attorney made the argument and assertion that the "Appellant has 
not even attempted to marshal the evidence . . ." (Brief of Appellee at 9). The 
Appellant's brief contained an extensive compilation of the facts. In the argument 
section, the Appellant referred to the findings or lack thereof that the trial judge 
made that supported his decision to deny defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. 
In State in re W.A. v. State, 2002 UT 127, (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that "marshaling requires that the party challenging the finding show 
us where the evidence can be located and list the specific evidence supporting the 
verdict." Id. The Appellant has done this throughout his brief, both in the facts 
and in the argument. 
In Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), this Court stated that 
"[i]n order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, 
the challenger must ferret out a fatal law in the evidence." Id. at 726. 
Furthermore, in the case of State v. Larsen 999 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2000) the court held: 
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Defendant "must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings 
against an attack. " (Citing State v. Moosman 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 
1990)) 
The Appellant met the marshaling requirement throughout the brief. The 
facts were well spelled out in detail with references to the record. The Appellant's 
argument referred to the limited evidence the trial judge utilized in coming to his 
decision to deny the defendants motion to withdraw his plea. The Defendant 
furthermore cited to the record and showed this Court where the evidence can be 
located, as well as attaching each relevant page of the hearing transcripts in the 
addendum. It was then that the brief attacked the trial court's legal and factual 
conclusions. 
The State's brief cited several references to the defendant's intoxication or 
lack thereof. Each of these references is clearly cited in the defendants brief. For 
sake of clarity defendant will restate each citation in defendants brief regarding the 
trial courts inquiry into the defendant's alleged intoxication. 
'The trial court asked the Defendant, 'Now, you're not under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs here today in court, are you?' The Defendant answered, 'No.' 
(R. 41/7) In a discussion on the Defendant's custody status between plea and 
sentencing, the prosecutor raised the issue that the Defendant had been drinking 
and should be taken into custody. The court asked how the prosecutor knew that he 
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had been drinking and the prosecutor stated, T can tell he's been drinking. I can 
smell it.' (R. 41/8) The trial court then made a cursory inquiry as to the 
Defendant's drinking by asking, 'Well, I just asked you if you had had anything to 
drink, any alcohol or drugs, and you said no.' The Defendant answered, T'm not 
under the influence of alcohol.' The Judge then said, 'Okay. You're not under the 
influence of alcohol.' To which the Defendant answered, 'No.' The Judge then 
asked, "but you have been drinking?' to which the Defendant answered, T have a 
little bit of a back problem.' (R. 41/9) The trial court made no further inquiry as to 
the amount of alcohol consumed by the Defendant, and whether or not he could 
even competently answer the questions regarding his level of intoxication. The 
court then took the Defendant's plea of guilty. (R. 41/10) The court immediately 
had the Defendant taken into custody due in part to the fact that he had been 
drinking and that 'this is just too dangerous to leave you out with this kind of 
situation.'" (R. 41/14) (Brief of Appellant 7,8) 
"The trial court acknowledged that the Defendant had been drinking at the 
time that he entered his guilty plea. (R. 41/65) The trial court ruled that after 
viewing the video of the proceedings, the court didn't see anything that suggested 
that the Defendant was impaired. The trial court stated, T didn't see slurred speech, 
I didn't see wavering or, or having trouble standing up or talking at all.' (R. 41/66) 
The court further stated, 'you seemed to understand all of the questions that I put to 
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you and your answers appeared to be articulate and coherent.' (R. 41/66)" (Brief of 
Appellant 9) 
"The trial court then ruled: 'So I'm going to find that we satisfied Rule 11. 
I'm also going to find that the plea in this case was both voluntary and knowing. 
And you may have been drinking but I just don't think that you were under the 
influence of an alcohol to a degree that it rendered you incapable of understanding 
what was going on that day.' (R. 41/66)" (Brief of Appellant 10) 
"On the last of those hearing, the trial court heard arguments, heard from the 
Defendant, and apparently viewed the videotape of the plea proceeding. After 
those hearings, the trial court denied the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea." 
(Brief of Appellant 11) 
"Although six months after the plea hearing, the trial court made the finding 
that the defendant was not under the influence to the degree that he was impaired, 
the court did not review the appropriate factors. The trial court stated the test was: 
[N]ot whether [the defendant] had been drinking, but as Mr. Laker 
points out whether or not you were intoxicated, whether you were so 
impaired that you didn't understand what you were doing at the time 
you stood here in court and entered a guilty plea. That's the real issue 
here.(R.41/64)" (Brief of Appellant 13) 
"The trial court error in the present case did not inquire further into the 
Defendant's mental condition once the court had been advised that the Defendant 
had consumed alcohol prior to the plea hearing. The court was clearly aware that 
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the Defendant had been drinking to the extent that the prosecutor, sitting at counsel 
table could smell the alcohol emanating from the Defendant as he stood at the 
lectern. The trial court made no inquiry into the amount of alcohol the Defendant 
had drunk, nor the time frame in which he had consumed the alcohol." (Brief of 
Appellant 114, 15) 
"Although the Defendant did state that he had been drinking 'early this 
morning' (R. 41/9) the trial court did not inquire as to how previous that had 
occurred. Given the fact that the court commenced at 2:00 PM, the defendant very 
well may have been under the influence of alcohol at the time the plea was taken." 
(Brief of Appellant 15, footnote 1) 
Clearly the defendant adequately marshaled the evidence. In fact, the 
references to the evidence that support the trial court's decision were referred to 
more often, and in greater detail in the defendant's brief than they were in the 
State's brief. Despite these numerous references, the evidence clearly indicates that 
the trial court did not adequately insure that the defendant was not intoxicated at 
the time he entered his plea. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant did marshal the evidence in his brief. All of the factors the 
trial court relied on in making its decision to deny defendant's motion to withdraw 
his plea were referred to and cited to the record. Most of them were referred to 
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multiple times. The Appellant is then entitled to attack those findings, which is 
exactly what he did. This Court should look at the merits of the Appellant's 
argument which is that all of the evidence notwithstanding, the defendant, due to 
his intoxicated state could not knowing and voluntarily enter a plea.. 
DATED this J_ day of January, 2004. 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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